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Introduction
This paper analyzes a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. More precisely, we extend the canonical model of Crawford and Sobel [3] (hereafter, CS) to a setting where the receiver is also endowed with some private information of her own, on top of the sender's message which can be observed subsequently. Within this framework, we ask how the receiver's prior knowledge affects the strategic nature of communication and, in particular, the amount of information conveyed by the sender via cheap talk messages.
Recently, several papers have explored this problem, i.e., how the nature of communication alters when the receiver becomes more informed in a broad sense (Chen [2] , Lai [7] , Moreno de Barreda [4] ). 1 While they differ in their ways to add the receiver's private information to the model, all of these studies by and large show that the more informed the receiver is, the less information she can extract from the sender. A similar conclusion is also obtained in models with multiple senders (Austen-Smith [1] , Morgan and Stocken [8] , Galeotti et al. [5] ). 2 For instance, Morgan and Stocken [8] examine information aggregation in polls and show that truth telling is impossible when the size of a poll is sufficiently large.
The main logic behind this result is fairly simple, if we carefully dissect why any information can be conveyed via cheap talk messages. To see this, consider the standard setup of CS where the state of nature is denoted by t ∈ [0, 1]. The receiver's bliss point is t whereas the sender's is t + b, b > 0, meaning that the sender always prefers a larger action than the receiver, and hence has an incentive to exaggerate his message. The key insight of CS is that even in this case, the receiver can still extract some information from the sender by dividing the state space into intervals. These intervals endogenously create the cost of exaggeration because if the sender exaggerates and sends a message in the next interval, the resultant action could move further to the right (towards one) and away from his bliss point. In other words, what makes this strategy work is the sensitivity of the receiver's action to the sender's (misrepresented) message.
Since the receiver naturally becomes less sensitive to the sender's message when she has private information of her own, the sender's incentive to exaggerate his information is magnified and, as a consequence, the quality of communication deteriorates.
So, does this mean that the impact of the receiver's prior knowledge on the quality of communication is invariably negative? While this conclusion, and the reasoning behind it, appear fairly robust, it is still hard to believe that this single mechanism is all there is to this problem: intuition certainly suggests that there are also situations where it is more difficult to lie to a better informed receiver, so that the receiver's prior knowledgable facilitates, rather than impedes, communication. If this is the case, i.e., there is a route through which more information facilitates communication, it means that the existing literature overlooks some critical link between the receiver's information on one hand and the quality of communication on the other. The aim of this paper is to find this "missing piece" in this class of problems, if any, which hopefully gives us a clearer insight on the role of information in strategic communication.
The point of departure from the existing literature is our explicit focus on the "dual role" of the sender's message: when the receiver is partially informed, the sender's message can provide information not only about the true state but also about the reliability of the receiver's private information. The latter aspect, which has been largely neglected in the literature, is the driving force of our model. To see how this works, note that the receiver knows that her private information is less reliable than the sender's. 3 If the sender's message is consonant with what she privately knows, she thinks that her private information is more likely to be correct and, consequently, places more weight on it. As the receiver relies more on her own information, her action necessarily becomes less sensitive to the sender's message. If the message is not consonant with her private information, on the other hand, she loses her confidence in her private information and her action becomes more sensitive to the message. Since the sender's message is more likely to be consonant with the receiver's private information when the sender truthfully reveals his information, the receiver reacts less to the truthful message and more to the misrepresented one.
As we will clarify in more detail later, this asymmetric response of the receiver is essential in disciplining the sender to be more truthful and hence facilitating communication between them.
We think that adding private information to the receiver's side is a natural extension of the existing literature and poses an intriguing question in itself, as it is not a priori clear whether the quality of communication improves or deteriorates when the receiver has more precise information. The extension also yields more practical implications when how much information to collect on her own is the receiver's endogenous choice. If the quality of communication diminishes as the receiver becomes more informed, then information acquisition and communication are substitutes, and the incentive to collect information certainly diminishes when the sender's information is expected to be reliable. In contrast, if the quality of communication enhances as the receiver becomes more informed, information acquisition and communication are complements, and the incentive to collect information intensifies. Our analysis shows that information acquisition and communication can be complements, rather than substitutes as the previous literature indicates, depending on the information structure on the receiver's side.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model which is an extension of CS.
Section 3 characterizes equilibria of the model and discusses their implications. Finally, section 4 offers some concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to Appendix.
The Model
We consider an extended version of CS's uniform-quadratic model. There are two players, the sender (male) and the receiver (female), and the model goes as follows. 3. The receiver observes a private signal r ∈ [0, 1] which is drawn according to the following probability:
where I is the indicator function and λ is Lebesgue measure. In other words, the signal reflects the true state, i.e., r = t, with probability q while it is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] with probability 1 − q.
4. Upon observing m and r, the receiver chooses an action a ∈ [0, 1].
The payoff for the receiver is
whereas that for the sender is
We call b the bias and assume b ∈ (0, 0.5).
The only difference from the original CS model is that we allow for the possibility that the receiver observes a possibly informative signal of the state of nature. The signal is either perfectly informative (with probability q) or noisy (with the remaining probability), but the receiver cannot tell whether any given signal is informative or noisy. What is critical in this specification is the way noise is introduced into the receiver's signal: in the current setting, there is a positive probability that the observed signal is a complete noise containing no useful information. 4 This feature is essential in giving rise to the dual role of the sender's message as we detail below. We interpret q as the accuracy of the signal where the model is equivalent to the original CS model when q = 0.
Analysis

The equilibrium concept
Throughout the analysis, we focus on the class of monotone partition equilibria, which is a subset of perfect Bayesian equilibria, defined as below. • T i is a non-empty interval for any i ∈ I,
• µ t = µ t for any i ∈ I and any t, t ∈ T i , and
• Supp µ t ∩ Supp µ t = ∅ for any distinctive i, i ∈ I and any t ∈ T i , t ∈ T i .
A monotone partition equilibrium (MPE) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the sender's strategy is an MPS.
We can show that any MPE consists of finite intervals.
Proposition 1 For any MPE, I is a finite set.
Based on this proposition, we denote any MPE partition by {T n } n=1,...,N where N is some natural number and sup T n = inf T n+1 for n = 1, . . . , N − 1. We call T n the nth interval.
Furthermore, we identify an MPS with a partition {T n } n=1,...,N as a vector t = (t 0 , . . . , t N ) defined as
We call such t n a threshold. Note that 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = 1. Let τ n = t n − t n−1 denote the length of the nth interval which, as usual, is taken as a measure of the quality of communication:
the shorter each interval is, the more information is conveyed via cheap talk in equilibrium.
The receiver's problem
In any MPS, the receiver has two sources of information: her own signal r and the sender's message m which indicates in which interval the true state is lying. Given this, the receiver's equilibrium strategy is pure and we denote it by α(m, r). Furthermore, the actions induced on any equilibrium path are determined as follows:
if ∃n ∀t ∈ T n µ t (m) > 0 and r ∈ T n ,
if ∃n ∀t ∈ T n µ t (m) > 0 and r / ∈ T n .
Note that the receiver uses her own information only when the sender's message falls into the same interval. On the other hand, the receiver sees her private information as a noise and disregards it altogether if the message does not agree with her private signal, given that the sender plays the equilibrium (truth-telling) strategy. This is the critical feature of the current model: when the message is "close" to the receiver's signal, she places more confidence in her signal; when it is "further away", she relies less on it and more on the sender's message. As we will see later, this asymmetric response is what disciplines the sender to be more truthful.
The current model provides a setup which captures this dual role of the sender's message in a relatively tractable manner.
Remark 1 This argument implies that a subtle difference in the information structure could result in a large qualitative change in equilibrium outcomes. 2 , the presence of the receiver's prior information makes her less sensitive to the misrepresented message, which magnifies the incentive to exaggerate.
The equilibrium conditions
Given the receiver's strategy, we can now identify the conditions for an MPE with a partition t (an MPE with t for short) by checking the sender's incentives. In particular, what we need to see is that given some partition t and the true state t, the sender has no incentive to deviate by sending a "nearby" message. To this end, define ∆(t; t n−1 , t n , t n+1 ) as follows:
where m n is any message sent (with positive probability) when the true state lies in the nth interval. Then, a necessary condition for the equilibrium with N intervals is that ∆(t; t n−1 , t n , t n+1 ) ≤ 0 for t ∈ (t n−1 , t n ) ≥ 0 for t ∈ (t n , t n+1 )
holds for any n = 1, . . . , N − 1. Moreover, a sufficient condition is that ∆(t; t n−1 , t n , t n+1 ) ≤ 0 for t < t n ≥ 0 for t > t n holds for any n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
In the original CS model, the length of each partition must satisfy certain conditions in equilibrium: in the linear-quadratic specification, each interval must be exactly 4b longer than the last. The following result establishes the conditions along this line in our extended setup.
6 Strictly speaking, in Lai [7] , the threshold, which is exogenously set at 0.5 in this example, is also only private known and drawn from the uniform distribution. 7 In contrast, if the sender reveals truthfully, the receiver ignores her own signal and chooses a = . We do not focus much on this side because there is no qualitative difference in the way the receiver updates her belief. Even though the receiver ignores her own signal, this is to some extent a figment of the simplified information structure as assumed here. For instance, if the receiver's signal space is partitioned into three intervals, very low [0, ε), low [ε, 0.5) and high [0.5, 1], and the true state lies in [ε, 0.5), she uses both pieces of her information and chooses a = on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 2 Define
(i) A necessary and sufficient condition for an MPE with MPS {T n } n=1,...,N is G + (τ n , τ n+1 ; q) ≥ 0 and G − (τ n , τ n+1 ; q) ≤ 0 for n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
(ii) For any τ n ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1), there exists τ (τ n , q) and τ (τ n , q) such that G + (τ n , τ n+1 ; q) ≥ 0 and G − (τ n , τ n+1 ; q) ≤ 0 if and only if τ (τ n , q) ≤ τ n+1 ≤ τ (τ n , q).
(iii) For any τ n ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1), G + (τ n , τ (τ n , q); q) = 0 and G − (τ n , τ (τ n , q); q) = 0.
(iv) For any τ n ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1), 2b < τ (τ n , q) ≤ τ n + 4b ≤ τ (τ n , q) and
The proposition shows that the equilibrium conditions are less stringent when q > 0 in that the length of each partition only needs to be in some range. With more breathing room, we can construct "more informative" equilibria. To see the intuition behind this result, consider an equilibrium with two intervals, {[0, t 1 ], (t 1 , 1]}. When q = 0, it is straightforward to compute α(m 0 , r) = t 1 /2 and α(m 1 , r) = (t 1 + 1)/2 regardless of r. At t = t 1 , the sender must be indifferent between the two messages, i.e., his bliss point must be at the midpoint of α(m 0 , r) and α(m 1 , r). Let b denote the bias which satisfies
It is well known that the second interval must be exactly 4b longer than the first in this linearquadratic specification.
We now let q increase above zero and see how that changes the sender's incentives. There are two effects at work, which we call the information effect and the risk effect for expositional clarity, depending on whether the receiver observes a correct signal or not. These effects are absent when the receiver is uninformed (q = 0), and mark a key departure from the original CS model.
First, suppose that the true state is t = t 1 , and also that the receiver happens to observe the true state, i.e., r = t 1 (though she does not know it for sure). If the sender reveals truthfully,
i.e., m = m 0 , the receiver's private signal is consonant with the sender's message, and the receiver combines the two pieces of evidence to determine her action: the resultant action is hence necessarily gravitated towards the true state t 1 away from what the message indicates,
i.e., t 1 /2. If the sender chose to deviate and send m = m 1 , on the other hand, the receiver's reaction would totally be different, now that the sender's message is dissonant with the receiver's signal. Under the presumption that the sender plays the equilibrium strategy, the receiver must think that her signal is a noise and places zero weight in Bayesian updating: the resultant action hence stays at (t 1 +1)/2 regardless of q. We refer to this as the information effect of the receiver's prior knowledge, which works to discipline the sender to be more truthful.
Second, suppose that the receiver observes r = t, in which case she (mistakenly) uses her private signal with some positive probability. Given that τ 1 > τ 0 , r ∈ τ 1 is the more dominant case. In this case, if the sender follows the equilibrium strategy, the receiver now ignores her signal and deterministically chooses an action regardless of r; if he deviates, the receiver combines the wrong signal with the message and hence produces a stochastic action. The stochastic nature of the latter case introduces irrelevant noise into the receiver's action, thereby reducing the expected payoff. We refer to this as the risk effect which also works to discipline the sender to be more truthful. 8 With these two effects and the consequent asymmetric response, t = t 1 is no longer on the border. It is now strictly better for the sender with t = t 1 to send m = m 0 , meaning that the threshold can be "pushed further to the right." Even with the same number of intervals, we can construct a more informative equilibrium by having more equally divided intervals. We will formalize the above discussion in the next subsection.
Can more information facilitate communication?
We are now ready to address our main question of how a change in q affects the nature of communication. We first establish that an increase in q per se enhances the payoffs of both players. To this end, define V i (t; q), i = S, R, as player i's ex ante expected payoff. Then, we can obtain the following result.
This result is somewhat straightforward as it simply states that the players benefit from having access to more information. What is more interesting is whether an increase in q can afford a more efficient way of communication, or a more efficient configuration of the equilibrium partition. To this end, it is convenient to associate each MPE explicitly with the information accuracy q and denote it by an MPE-q. Given this, we define the following notions.
Definition 2 We say that:
(ii) More information facilitates communication at (q, q ), q > q , if for any MPE-q with t , there exists an MPE-q with a partition t which is more efficient than t at q .
Given this, we can obtain the following result which is derived directly from Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 For any MPE-0 with t and any q > 0, t also constitutes an MPE-q. Furthermore, more information facilitates communication at (q, 0) for any q > 0. If τ n < τ n+1 holds for n = 1, . . . N − 1, the most efficient equilibrium requires τ n = τ (τ n , q)
for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 (Lemma 6 in the Appendix). Unfortunately, in our setting, τ n < τ n+1 is violated in some MSE. See the following example:
and q is sufficiently large, there exists an MPE with two intervals where τ 1 ≥ τ 2 . This is verified from the fact that G + (0.5, 0.5; q) > 0 holds for a sufficiently large q.
However, it is verified that a partition of this kind never constitutes an MPE whenever q is sufficiently small (Lemma 7 in the Appendix). Moreover, it is also verified that τ is strictly decreasing in q whenever q is sufficiently small (Lemma 8 in the Appendix). From these facts, we conclude that more information facilitates communication whenever we focus on the situation where the accuracy is sufficiently low.
Proposition 5 There exists a q > 0 such that for any q ∈ (0, q] and q < q, more information facilitates communication at (q, q ).
As a final note, we would like to present some counterexamples to show that the effect of the receiver's prior knowledge does not monotonically improve the quality of communication. information results in a less efficient partition when q is sufficiently close to one. The reason for this is that as q increases, the receiver's signal becomes more accurate and more likely to fall into the right interval. An increase in q thus makes the risk effect less relevant, which works as the first-order effect. Since the risk effect is more salient when the bias is large, this first-order effect eventually dominates and lowers the quality of communication as q approaches one.
It is important to note, however, that our focus is generally on the case where q is relatively small because there is little point in communicating when the receiver already knows the true state with sufficient precision. We can thus argue that in a class of situations where communication is relevant and beneficial, the effect of the receiver's prior knowledge on the quality of communication is largely positive, if the underlying information structure has a feature that gives rise to the dual role of the sender's message.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk messages. This contrasting result is mainly due to the structure of the receiver's private information we assume. While we do not intend to insist that the information structure of the current form is a necessary feature in this class of problems, it provides an insight that the information structure matters for the impact of the receiver's information on the quality of communication. In future, it seems worthwhile to explore more on this point, as to when and under what conditions the receiver's information facilitates communication.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof closely follows that of Proposition 1 of Moreno de Barreda [4] and directly stems from the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The width of an interval T i in Difinition 1 is longer than or equal to 2b unless inf T i = 0.
Proof:
Suppose to the contrary that there exists an interval T i such that
We divide the situation into the following two cases: {inf T i } / ∈ T i or {inf T i } ∈ T i .
We first consider the case of {inf T i } / ∈ T i . In this case the point inf T i belongs to another interval, say T j , and inf T j ≤ sup T j = inf T i < sup T i This is a contradiction.
Lemma 5 Given t = (t 0 , . . . t N ), t = (t 0 , . . . t N ), andn such that
• tn > t n ,
• t n = t n for n =n, and
• τn < τn +1 .
Then, t is more efficient than t under any q.
We denote
Then, it suffices to show that
It is verified that ∂ ∂τ ∂M ∂q < 0,
These imply that ∂ ∂q M (τ n , q) + M (τ n+1 , q) − M (τ n , q) − M (τ n+1 , q) > 0.
Combining this with the fact that
we obtain the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof is based on the following series of lemmas.
Lemma 6 Given b and q > 0. If t is the most efficient MPE and τ n < τ n+1 for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, then τ n+1 = τ (τ n , q) for n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
